Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention
Contemporary cognitive science clearly
tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched
in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor
develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical
work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic achievements and virtues.
The resulting study is the first sustained, naturalized virtue epistemology, and will be of interest to readers in epistemology,
cognitive science, and beyond.
Introduction: why only agents are knowers; 1. Epistemic virtue, reliable attention and
cognitive constitution; 2. Meta-epistemology and epistemic agency; 3. Success semantics and the etiology of success; 4. Epistemic
agency; 5. Assertion as epistemic motivation; 6. Curiosity and epistemic achievement; 7. Collective agency, assertion and
This title provides the first thorough defense of a naturalized virtue epistemology.