Mind in Action
«compelling and sophisticated book ... the general approach in this book owes a great deal to Wittgenstein, relying heavily as it does on an analysis of how psychological terms function in everyday language, and it is refreshing to see this approach so scrupulously applied to contemporary problems ... this book is a stimulating read and I would happily commend it to anyone working in these, and related, fields of research ... Whether or not you are ultimately convinced by the arguments themselves, you will be impressed by the depth and clarity of the exposition.»
William Fish, MIND 109,433 January 2000
Challenges the view that human action is driven by thoughts and desires much as a machine is made to function by the operation of physical causes. The author rejects the materialist view of mind and the causal theory of action; his alternative approach elucidates such key concepts as thought, belief, desire, intention, and freedom. Les mer
Detaljer
- Forlag
- Oxford University Press
- Innbinding
- Innbundet
- Språk
- Engelsk
- ISBN
- 9780198236917
- Utgivelsesår
- 1997
- Format
- 22 x 15 cm
Anmeldelser
«compelling and sophisticated book ... the general approach in this book owes a great deal to Wittgenstein, relying heavily as it does on an analysis of how psychological terms function in everyday language, and it is refreshing to see this approach so scrupulously applied to contemporary problems ... this book is a stimulating read and I would happily commend it to anyone working in these, and related, fields of research ... Whether or not you are ultimately convinced by the arguments themselves, you will be impressed by the depth and clarity of the exposition.»
William Fish, MIND 109,433 January 2000
«The book is full of careful, detailed, sometimes terse and difficult, but never dogmatic discussions of the central concepts concerned with thought and action, including animal mentality and behaviour ... more than just revisiting old, familiar places; it is relocating some old truths ... This is a welcome book.»
Graeme Marshall, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol 77 no 3 September 1999