These essays by Robert Schwartz on topics in the theory of vision are written from a pragmatic perspective. The issues and
arguments will interest both philosophers and psychologists, covering new ground and bridging gaps between these disciplines.
Schwartz begins historically, with discussions of problems raised and solutions offered in Bishop Berkeley's writings on vision,
presenting Berkeley's views on spatial perception and the qualitative aspects of sensory experience in the context of recent
theoretical and empirical work in vision theory. Schwartz then turns to debates in both the philosophical and psychological
literature over the view that perception is inferential and thus "indirect." Critically surveying competing characterizations
of the idea of "inferential processes" he argues the need either to reframe radically the question or drop the issue. Next,
Schwartz discusses pictorial representation and research on picture perception. Drawing on the work of Nelson Goodman, Schwartz
explains and defends the advantages of a symbolic approach to both topics. Finally, he examines the quagmires that often develop
when metaphysical concerns about the "real" and our ability to perceive it infect discussions and claims in the theory of
vision. After analyzing issues arising in current psychological research on "object" perception, Schwartz turns to debates
over the supposed essential nature of colors. An appreciation of the empirical and theoretical work on color perception suggests
that there is no single or privileged analysis of the notion of "real colors." Schwartz circles back in the end to what he
calls "that old chestnut of the philosophy of perception" -- controversies over "the objects of perception" -- and takes an
Austinian look at the topic.
In this book, Robert Schwartz links various themes in the philosophy of perception in
novel and highly illuminating ways. His maverick range of interests, and his sharp sense of the interconnections between them,
demand the serious attention of all those interested in the philosophy of vision. -- Robert Hopkins, University of Sheffield
These essays move nimbly over a broad theoretical landscape, from Berkeley and Helmholtz to Gibson and computational approachers.
Along the way Schwartz offers many illuminating observations related to perceived spatial layout, perceived color, the perception
of objects, and the nature of perceptual representation. Vision scientists and philosophers of psychology will find this collection
rewarding. -- William Epstein, Department of Psychology, University of Virginia