Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth
«'Blake E. Hestir's scholarship has consistently encouraged readers of Plato and Aristotle to pay closer attention to the rich, sometimes unexpected details of their conceptions of truth and falsity. This book is an accomplished, welcome extension of Hestir's efforts to date. I especially appreciated the impressive engagement with the Sophist's metaphysics and the patient accounting of Plato's conception of truth. For students of Plato's semantics and metaphysics more generally, Hestir's book offers lots of food for thought. I highly recommend it.' Christine J. Thomas, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews»
What is the nature of truth? Blake E. Hestir offers an investigation into Plato's developing metaphysical views, and examines Plato's conception of being, meaning, and truth in the Sophist, as well as passages from several other later dialogues including the Cratylus, Parmenides, and Theaetetus, where Plato begins to focus more directly on semantics rather than only on metaphysical and epistemological puzzles. Les mer
Detaljer
- Forlag
- Cambridge University Press
- Innbinding
- Paperback
- Språk
- Engelsk
- ISBN
- 9781107584808
- Utgivelsesår
- 2019
- Format
- 23 x 15 cm
Anmeldelser
«'Blake E. Hestir's scholarship has consistently encouraged readers of Plato and Aristotle to pay closer attention to the rich, sometimes unexpected details of their conceptions of truth and falsity. This book is an accomplished, welcome extension of Hestir's efforts to date. I especially appreciated the impressive engagement with the Sophist's metaphysics and the patient accounting of Plato's conception of truth. For students of Plato's semantics and metaphysics more generally, Hestir's book offers lots of food for thought. I highly recommend it.' Christine J. Thomas, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews»
«'The study is rich in detailed analyses of arguments but never loses sight of the main point: an account of Plato's restricted ontology as the foundation for his thoughts about meaning and truth. To this end, the author introduces a grounding argument, articulated most explicitly at Parmenides 135b–c.' Jakob Leth Fink, Journal of the History of Philosophy»