Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge
"Grayling (philosophy, Birkbeck Coll., Univ. of London) sets himself the goal of refuting—or at least of attempting to refute—the philosophical doctrine that absolute knowledge is impossible. To do so, he considers two sets of arguments from major antiskeptical philosophers—Berkeley and Russell in one tradition and Quine and Wittgenstein in another—and argues that the strategies the aforementioned philosophers used to accomplish their goals are "not so much incorrect as incomplete." He thereupon argues in extensive, closely reasoned, if often turgid detail, his own stratagem—which, he believes, "is the right one overall." Because of the fecundity of the argument, readers will have a difficult time deciding if he has succeeded. This is not a book for beginners in philosophy: it deals with an issue most philosophers consider the central one in philosophy and requires extensive familiarity with the discipline, both current and historical. Recommended for academic collections."—Leon H. Brody, Falls Church, VA Library Journal
Leon H. Brody
A subject of particular resonance today when belief - religious and otherwise - can shape the modern world. Complex theories are brought to life by Grayling's skill and accessible style.A book on scepticism from Anthony Grayling is to be greatly valued. Les mer
We want to know or garner some kind of proof about the fundamental truths of human existence. This is the crux of the dilemma facing intelligent people today and is greatly illuminated by this book.
Detaljer
- Forlag
- Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.
- Innbinding
- Innbundet
- Språk
- Engelsk
- Sider
- 224
- ISBN
- 9781847061737
- Utgivelsesår
- 2008
- Format
- 22 x 14 cm
Anmeldelser
"Grayling (philosophy, Birkbeck Coll., Univ. of London) sets himself the goal of refuting—or at least of attempting to refute—the philosophical doctrine that absolute knowledge is impossible. To do so, he considers two sets of arguments from major antiskeptical philosophers—Berkeley and Russell in one tradition and Quine and Wittgenstein in another—and argues that the strategies the aforementioned philosophers used to accomplish their goals are "not so much incorrect as incomplete." He thereupon argues in extensive, closely reasoned, if often turgid detail, his own stratagem—which, he believes, "is the right one overall." Because of the fecundity of the argument, readers will have a difficult time deciding if he has succeeded. This is not a book for beginners in philosophy: it deals with an issue most philosophers consider the central one in philosophy and requires extensive familiarity with the discipline, both current and historical. Recommended for academic collections."—Leon H. Brody, Falls Church, VA Library Journal
Leon H. Brody