Governor's Dilemma
Kenneth W. Abbott (Redaktør) Bernhard Zangl (Redaktør) Duncan Snidal (Redaktør) Philipp Genschel (Redaktør)
«Overall, this volume not only advances our theoretical understanding of modes of governance and governance dynamics by putting theoretical "meat" behind when to expect delegation, trusteeship, cooptation, or orchestration to occur but also puts its fingers on crucial political dynamics that occur across the globe that are rooted in the innovative insight that is the governor's dilemma.»
Stephanie C. Hofmann, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international relations and comparative politics. Les mer
relationships face a dilemma: competent intermediaries gain power from the competencies they contribute, making them difficult to control, while efforts to control intermediary behavor limit important intermediary competencies, including expertise, credibility, and legitimacy. Thus, governors can obtain
either high intermediary competence or strong control, but not both. This competence-control tradeoff is a common condition of indirect governance, whether governors are domestic or international, public or private, democratic or authoritarian; and whether governance addresses economic, security, or social issues. The empirical chapters analyze the operation and implications of the governor's dilemma in cases involving the governance of violence (e.g., secret police, support for foreign rebel
groups, private security companies), the governance of markets (e.g., the Euro crisis, capital markets, EU regulation, the G20), and cross-cutting governance issues (colonial empires, "Trump's Dilemma"). Competence-control theory helps explain many features of governance that other theories cannot:
why indirect governance is not limited to principal-agent delegation, but takes multiple forms; why governors create seemingly counter-productive intermediary relationships; and why indirect governance is frequently unstable over time.
Detaljer
- Forlag
- Oxford University Press
- Innbinding
- Paperback
- Språk
- Engelsk
- ISBN
- 9780198855064
- Utgivelsesår
- 2020
- Format
- 23 x 15 cm
Anmeldelser
«Overall, this volume not only advances our theoretical understanding of modes of governance and governance dynamics by putting theoretical "meat" behind when to expect delegation, trusteeship, cooptation, or orchestration to occur but also puts its fingers on crucial political dynamics that occur across the globe that are rooted in the innovative insight that is the governor's dilemma.»
Stephanie C. Hofmann, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
«The Governor's Dilemma successfully combines cuttingedge theory with deeply sourced empirical studies to inaugurate new avenues of research. It will be an indispensable resource for future studies of indirect governance,...The Governor's Dilemma deserves to be read widely in all corners of political science.»
Orfeo Fioretos, Perspectives on Politics