The Failure of Counterinsurgency
Why Hearts and Minds Are Seldom Won
Leveringstid: Sendes innen 21 dager
Er du interessert i historiebøker ?
Bli med i fordelsklubben Vår historie og få fordelspris kr 422,-
Given the unsatisfactory outcomes of the counterinsurgency (COIN) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military is now in a heated debate over whether wars involving COIN operations are worth fighting. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of COIN through key historic episodes and concludes that the answer is an emphatic "no," based on a dominant record of U.S. military or political failure, and inconsistency in the reasons for the rare cases of success. The author also examines the implications of his findings for U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and future weapons procurement.
Examines a wider breadth of historical cases than other books on counterinsurgency, allowing for more accurate assessments and conclusions about the efficacy of COIN based on the lessons learned across history
Presents research-based evidence that the Unites States should get involved in counterinsurgency warfare only in the rare cases in which U.S. vital interests are at stake
Provides thought-provoking discussion of the domestic negative effects resulting from overseas counterinsurgency operations
Questions the effectiveness of COIN strategy by utilizing numerous historical examples covered throughout the book
Covers major instances of COIN warfare in history, including the French in Algeria and Indochina, the British in Malaysia and Afghanistan, the United States in Vietnam and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and numerous others
Appeals to readers and students of military history, strategy, and defense